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We al1 know that Japan and Japanese companies have become 
a major competitive force in world business. You can argue 
that they started from having a strong competitive 
advantage in manufacturing and infact this morning I was 
talking to John who was driving me in who was talking 
about the first Japanese cars that were sold in Britain in 
the late 19501s, early 60's. As he said the engines were 
terrific but the cars were terrible. They were badly 
styled, they corroded, they were not well suited to the 
local markets. But from that base in manufacturing 
technology, the engines, the Japanese were able to build 
and learn the other skills as they moved from a base in 
manufacturing Tto growing expertise in product design and 
now what we see is that the Japanese have also become a 
force in developing technology so from process to product 
to increasingly technology innovation.They have moved in 
that sense up the value chain in product design. Now just 
as western countries are starting to recognize the 
strengths of the Japanese system, the Japanese themselves 
are starting to ask i£ the organizations systems that got 
them to where they are today will be enough to help them 
be as successful in the future.These are the changes that 
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are pushing on the system. The first is that the Japanese 
see that in many areas of technology they can no longer 
rely on global technology scanning to identify the best 
technology in the world, bring it back to Japan, add value 
to it in products and manufacturing. They have to be start 
becoming technology developers. For the last three years 
in Japan there has been what the Japanese call a sort of 
an uproar about pushing £or basic technology, basic 
research and so far it is very difficult to see how much 
has actually been done. Certainly the reported spending on 
basic R and D has gone up significantly in Japanese 
corporations but it's very hard to find out if the 
activities have changed as much as the classification. 
Many companies, when basic research became trendy and 
important, simply reclassified some o£ their activities 
from advanced technology development to basic research 
without changing the activities. But, clearly in some 
companies they are trying to develop more basic research 
and this is a challenge because the systems that have 
worked so well £or technology scanning and product 
technology development may not work as well in basic 
research and I will come back to that in a minute.The next 
link related up push £or higher value rated businesses. 
The Japanese see that their expertise in manufacturing is 
rapidly being emulated by other Asian countries,the 
Koreans, the Taiwanese, even in South Asia, southeast Asia 
and that other Arnerican and European manufacturers have 
creatively learned from Japanese successes and are rapidly 
improving their own technological base in manufacturing so 
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that in order to compete the Japanese want to pursue what 
they call higher value added businesses with a greater 
component of service, with a greater responsiveness to the 
market .There are two ways they are pursuing that, one is 
the developing of products directly to the customer 
through computer aided design and manufacture and they are 
now talking about the ability to deliver cars. In Japan 
now, not in the rest of the world but in Japan if you want 
to get a bicycle that is better than the bicycle youn 
would buy if you just walk into a shop and buy a standard 
mode1 but you donft want to pay the amount for a custom 
built craftsman bicycle, you can go to the national 
bicycle shops and you can be measured for a bicycle custom 
fit through the computer. The computer sends the order to 
the factory and two weeks later your bicycle is delivered 
to you made from standardized components assernbled to 
order. In pre-lab housing now for the last five years one 
of the largest housing companies in Japan, Sechsui? House, 
has a system whereby you go to a showroom in Japan, you 
sit down with the salesperson and you design your own 
house from pre-fabricated modules. You have a choice among 
five different styles of kitchen, six different styles of 
bedroom, they added it up and in al1 you have over twenty 
thousand choices that you can make. That order then goes 
to the factory through the computer. The components are 
assembled, the package is delivered to the building site 
and the house is built. This idea of customized 
standardization or standardized customization, depending 
on the label that the ability to use the capacity of the 
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computer to assernble standardized components into a 
tailored product is one of the directions the Japanese see 
as higher value added business. The other directions of 
higher value added business are linked to basic research 
and that is thinking up new products and new businesses 
that nobody knows that they want yet, anticipating the 
market technology, push rather than market pull.This means 
that increasingly large Japanese companies regard their R 
and D lab as the root of tomorrow's business so they look 
to their R and D people not just to develop new products 
but to think about new businesses.One of the things that 
this requires is that your people in R and D really 
understand business. They can't just understand 
technology. They also have to know business. One of the 
things that the Japanese companies have been doing £or 
many years is to train their R and D people the same way 
they train their managers. If you hired into a centra1 R 
and D lab in Japan even £or basic research and when you 
join the company you go through the same standardized 
training program as the management recruits and that 
training program can be anywhere from six weeks to half a 
year but it usually involves first the introduction to the 
company from the president . . . . . . . . .  Those messages are 
reinforced in a training program run in a sopecial 
training center by company people to educate new recruits 
in the culture of the company and the businesses o£ the 
company. Then those new recruits are given training 
assignments and rotated around different functions in the 
company so they spend some time on the factory floor 
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literally in the role of the blue-collar worker, 
assembling things. They spend some time in marketing and 
in some companies they spend some time actually selling, 
in OKI? Electric £or example,their recruits, to their R 
and D lab spend a few days in retails stores selling 
calculators, printers and so on along with competing 
products to customers to get a sense o£ what our customer 
is looking £or and how are we reaching them and we spend 
some time in some of the support functions before they 
ever get their initial assignment to join in the R and D 
lab. As a result o£ that, the young new engineer or 
science graduate goes into R and D with a basic 
comprehension o£ what the company is about, what its 
businesses are, who its competitors are and how it hopes 
to buildits businesses in the future.That's an important 
base on which to build this . This is also a reason why 
the companies look to the R and D labs not just as the 
source of higher new business £or the future but also £or 
the source o£ managers £or the future. The R and D labs 
are an importantcradle £or the next generation of 
managers. Most Japanese companies believe that you must 
understand technology in order to manage technology. 
That's why you will find a much higher proportion of 
Japanese managers coming to managing positions from the R 
and D lab, with the background from research and 
development. But one o£ the interesting questions is do 
you really want your to create new businesses £or you do 
you have to intensify this exposure to the business. How 
do you make sure that your R and D people will really 
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understand what it takes to create the new businesses £or 
tomorrow. linked to this is demographic changes. The 
Japanese poulation is very rapidly aging and by the year 
2020 they will have the oldest population o£ any o£ the 
industria1 countries. What this meansis that the supply o£ 
engineers is limited in Japan and increasingly limited as 
the Japanese are wanting more and more well-trained 
engineers and scientists so that they are looking to the 
problems o£ virtually O population growth and what 
challenges does that create £or company organizations that 
are very much built on a company seniority system, on a 
pyramid where you have large numbers o£ people coming in 
and then the pyramid narrowing as you go up as the base o£ 
that seniority pyramid starts to narrow what changes does 
that create in your organizational systems and linked to 
that changing values. This is a very controversia1 one 
that the Japanese talk about al1 the time the new folk, 
the new generation. I£ you go drinking with a Japanese 
manager in his 50's after the first drink or two, the odds 
are overwhelmingly likely that he will start to complain 
about the new young Japanese who are selfish, 
individualistic, they don't want to spend their week-ends 
working in the company, they want to play tennis, you ask 
them at five-thirty to go drinking with the group and they 
say "no, I don't want to, I have a date tonight" and they 
leave, you never used to see this in a Japanese company 
and they are very worried about what this means £or the 
future o£ Japan. Now, I have spent a lot o£ time studying 
the Japanese development over timeand this perhaps makes 
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me very cynical because you can read the same complaints 
from 50 year old Japanese in the 1880's and the 1920's and 
the 1950's. Almost every generation of Japanese have been 
convinced that the next generation is no longer really 
Japanese and that the country is falling apart because 
they don't really understand the meaning of effort and 
hard work. So it's very hard to know i£ this represents a 
rea1 change or whether or not it's just one of the worries 
that the Japanese managers have every generation. But one 
of the issues on changing values is perhaps a challenge to 
the ritualism of Japanese work practices. The young 
Japanese will say I'm willing to work hard, 1'11 put in 
as many hours as necessary but in my company people stay 
late not because they have rea1 work to do but because 
they want to show that they are working hard. Most 
Japanese believe, I think very sincerely, that the key to 
Japanese success in the post-war period has been effort, 
the effort and commitment of their people and most 
Japanese managers when pushed and many Japanese management 
experts will say that's what has made Japan great, effort, 
the hard work of its people. Now this has some problems of 
course because effort is very hard to measure as we al1 
know. But, one way to measure effort, particularly in 
management or R and D roles is how many hours you work and 
we see the same problems in American organizations where 
the harder it is actuallt to measure productivity, the 
longer hours managers are likely to spend at their desk in 
order to show that they are working hard. So, even if the 
new generation is less willing to work hard they may be 
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just as productive in the future. But the Japanese 
management system is having to cope with a younger 
generation which is less tollerant with the rituals of 
commitment and this has some interesting repercussions £or 
the system. Finally, and perhaps most important as a force 
£or change internationalization. As you know one of the 
strengths of the Japanese technology system in the firm 
has been a very close connection between R and D and 
manudfacturing. What's happening now as the Japanese are 
increasingly having to put production off shore in order 
to get cheaper manufacturing costs or to get round trade 
barriers. There is a danger that that tight linkage 
between R and D and production may stretch too thin and 
they are now facing a challenge of putting R and D off 
shore increasingly as they are starting to do. Theyare 
setting up R and D centers in the USA, they're starting to 
set up the same centers in Europe. One of the challenges 
£or them is, do the R and D systems that work well in 
Japan work well abroad and the answer is of course no they 
don't very well. So the challenge is to what extent do 
they have to adapt to local practices in R and D. They 
have shown a very great ability to export their 
organizational patterns in production as we have seen in 
the USA in auto transplants particularly. They have taken 
Japanese work practices and managed to transfer them, 
modify them to the American environment but in essence 
maintain many of the basic features. That is going to be 
much harder to do in R and D because the technology people 
and the scientific experts are used to different roles in 
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America and in Eurpoe than they have in the Japanese 
system. So they have to have more modification and feeding 
the problems of demographic change and changing values 
more and more Western companies are starting to set up R 
and D centers in Japan, in Tokyo and this has very 
interesting challenges £or the Japaneses system because as 
you have an increasing shortage of engineers you have 
increasing competition in the labor markets, £or the 
engineers that are being produced. This is a particular 
problem £or large Japanese industria1 firms. The 
competition £or engineers is coming both from foreign 
companies entering Japan and from banks and trading 
companies and financial institutions who are themselves 
pursuing higher added value business £or which they feel 
they need technologists on their staffs, pursuing venture 
capita1 business £or example overseas, pursuing technology 
alliances and acquisitions. So, they are starting to enter 
the market £or engineering and science graduates in 
Japan.Now, the technical labor markets in Japan to the 
present, has worked in a manner that to outsiders looks 
very peculiar but has worked very well £or Japanese 
companies. For the master's graduate in engineering and 
science who are the key players here in the R and D labs, 
the elite professors will write one letter of 
reccomendation £or each student to one company. If I am a 
professor of Tokyo university and I have ten master 
students in my lab I have an obligation with companies to 
send one to Cannon, one to Fujitsu, one to NEC and I send 
one and I decide which one. The company doesn't decide, 
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the student doesn't decide, I decide. If my student 
doesn't want to go to NEC and I have written a letter to 
NEC, my student will not get a lob in any elite Japanese 
company. My student has a choice between going to NEC or 
then going to a medium or small-scale firm or perhaps one 
o£ the foreign companies. Thereason this system started in 
the 1950's was in a system o£ scarcity o£ technical talent 
in a seniority based economy and i£ your wages are 
seniority based companies cannot afford to bid up entry 
leve1 salaries because it destroys the seniority wage 
system so the current system is an implicit agreement, 
almost a carte1 among the companies where they will agree 
not to bid against each other in the market but to use an 
allocation system. It discriminates against small 
companies, medium-sized companies and foreign companies 
and the system may well be one of the reasons why medium 
and small-scale Japanese companies have not been major 
innovators in technology in comparison to American and 
European medium and small-scale companies. It's been 
harder £or them to get good technical talent. If this 
system starts to erode through competition from banks and 
foreign companies, then there's a challenge to the entire 
Japanese system. One o£ the reasons that the Japanese have 
been able to link theirtechnology organization and their R 
and D organization as well as they have is their movement 
to people. I£ you look at the R and D labs the new 
graduates enter the corporate R and D lab from university 
after the training proram they will spend six to ten years 
in the corporate R and D lab and then they will move to a 
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divisional lab that is attached to a manufacturing 
facility. They will usually move with a project, that is 
i£ they have been the lead innovator on a new product 
development, when that product moves into production they 
transfer that person to the divisional lab to see that 
product through production and that person stays in the 
divisional lab as part o£ a carrer move and will spend the 
next three to five years usually working on incrementa1 
product improvement and process improvement on that 
product or a related product and will then move into line 
mangement in the manufacturing and production organization 
so you have a constant move o£ people out of R and D into 
applied research and into line management. What this has 
maent is that you have this very strong overlap between R 
and D and production and one o£ the things that makes this 
movement of people very easy is the standardization of 
salaries and rewards within the Japanese company. When you 
join a Japanese company, you start at the same entry level 
salary, based on your education and age, regardless o£ 
whether you go into R and D or production or marketing or 
a staff function. The salaries are the same and they're 
set every year through negotiation with the company union 
annua1 negotiations in the Spring which fix the salary 
grades o£ al1 employees below the level of section head 
which means that the individual managers or the individual 
functions have no freedom to play very much with the 
reward structures. If £or example, I work £or NEC and I've 
been in the corporate R and D lab £or five years and an 
Arnerican lab, setting up a lab, says we'd really like to 
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hire you and we'llpay you twenty-five percent more than 
you're getting with NEC; i£ I were in an American company 
I would go to my boss and say I just got a wonderful offer 
from an outside company, what are you going to do about 
it? My boss would probably say we'll raise your salary, we 
can match that salary, the Japanese boss cannot do that. 
Severa1 interviews that a colleague of mine has done in 
Japanese R and D labs about this competition has found 
that most Japanese R and D managers cannot and would not 
make a counter offer. They cannot because the wages are 
standardized and they would not because they don't think 
someone who would want to leave £or another company would 
only be kept by money, would be worth keeping in the first 
place. If they want to leave let them go, we don't need 
them. that standardization of wages helps this constant 
movement of people across the functions in the Japanese 
companies. If you have to start raising salaries in your 
techology development organization then you throw the 
entire reward sysytem of the company out of wack and 
create enormous difficulties £or yourself in the future. 
To date the Japanese companies have been unwilling to 
alter their standarized reward systems and infact you can 
argue that they have very little choice, they can't alter 
those systems. What our company is doing to respond to 
these things, one of the things they're doing in terms of 
corporate R and D organization is to create an increasing 
number of corporate labs. NEC £or example moved from one 
centra1 R and D lab to about thirteen corporate basic R 
and D labs simply by sub-dividing your lab into different 
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labs. You kept them al1 in the same building, they didn't 
move their location, you simply gave names to them. Now, 
we've got information systems lab. One of the advantages 
o£ that o£ course, is that it helps you create promotions 
internally. Japanese R and D organizations are very flat 
because o£ this movement o£ people, they have very young 
age structures. In their corporate R and D labs the 
average age is usually thirty and it stays thirty because 
older researchers are usually moved out except £or a very 
small number of research managers. Some of whom stay in 
the labs, some o£ whom comes back into the lab after some 
eexperience outside. But if you create thirteen labs, you 
go from having one laboratory head to having thirteen 
laboratory heads. You can go from having eight department 
heads to having eight times thirteen department heads. So 
you create more ladders o£ opportunity internally £or your 
people and therefore more opportunity to use reward 
structures as incentives. They're also adding a basic R 
and D lab. Hitachi was the first in 1985 to set up a basic 
R and D lab to do basic technology work. We haven't got 
very much information about these labs in terms o£ their 
interna1 organization but I have visited three o£ them now 
and one o£ the things that we have seen is that the 
organizational systems o£ the corporate lab and the 
influence on thinking in the basic research labs is very 
strong, even though these companies have often tried to 
set up their basic R and D centers physically away from 
the corporate R and d labs, a new site out in the woods to 
try and create a differnt mind set. It's very difficult 
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£or them to do that. Part o£ the problem is the very 
success that they have had in creating this product 
consciousness in the minds of their technology people, 
business consciousness. 1'11 give you one example. When we 
visited the Fujitsu centra1 R and D lab they have a small 
group working on basic technology in holygrams, 
holygraphic technology. They got into that originally 
because Miti, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry, started a government project about ten years ago 
on holygrams as part o£ their information systems in 
imaging, portfolios of technology. They asked Fujitsu to 
join. So Fujitsu hired some researchers in this area, set 
up a small lab within Fujitsu on holygram technology. 
After five years the government project ended and nothing 
much had come out of it £or Fujitsu. Fujitsu had a choice 
between simply moving its people to other parts of Fujitsu 
and ending the lab which they sometimes do or keeping it 
and they decided that this was a technology that might not 
be of use right then but in the future, if you think about 
imaging and information systems, holygrams might be 
useful, so they kept a core group of five people to 
continue basic research, no product development mandy. 
When we visited the lab after three years, after they 
reduced the size of the lab, we found that this lab had 
developed two new commercia1 products. The first one was 
an optical scanner £or cash regiesters using holygrams so 
that you could hold something like a tin of soup with a 
bar code on it and you could hold it any way, the bar code 
could be facing up, down and because of the holygrams it 
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could read it. They made it very small so that it could be 
used in mom and pop stores, very small retail stores where 
you often had grandmother or grandfather filling in from 
time to time on the cash register and they didn't 
understand bar codes and they did't know what they were 
and they didn't like them and they could never find them 
on the candy or whatever because they couldn't see them. 
But, grandma could just whip this thing across the scanner 
and it could read it no matter where she put the bar code 
and it was small enough to fit in a very tiny shop. Again, 
very product driven. The second product they developed was 
a golf tee, a practica golf tee £or your home. I don't 
play golf myself but Japanese are golf fanatics and 
apparently when you swing it's very important to keep your 
head still, so they did something where when you looked 
down you saw a holygram of a golf ball and if you moved 
your head you started to see three or four. Unless you 
kept your head perfectly still you'd start to see many 
golf balls down there. That's a way to teach you to keep 
your head still when you practice your swing. They said 
the reason they developed it was because the head of the R 
and D lab and the president of the company were crazy 
about golf and they were quite sure that if they could 
develop a product using their technologythat had something 
to do with golf they could keep the funding coming. What 
those stories te11 is the very strong product 
consciousness and business consciousness of your 
researchers. That's very useful in your corporate R and D 
labs, it might not be so useful in basic research., If 
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you're really trying to develop new technologies as 
opposed to thinking of creative applications o£ existing 
technologies. Just a couple more quick comments, then 1'11 
stop and ask you what you're interested in. They're 
clearly trying to think about, I talked about creating a 
basic R and d lab and lab fizzions, splitting up your lab 
into many labs, they're trying to think about whether or 
not they should change career structures. If you're trying 
to do more basic research do you need to keep your people 
in technology longer. They're trying to ask whether or 
not, if you're trying to develop basic research, you need 
to keep your people in the lab longer instead of moving 
them out into product development. ut one of the 
challenges £or the Japanese company is once you have 
created these highly standardized career structures, one 
o£ the reasons that your engineers except being moved out 
o£ R and D into the divisional lab and into line 
management is becuse everybody does it, it's the standard 
career,you don't have any choice. I£ you start keeping 
some people in basic research longer does that then become 
an elite career track and you have more people wanting to 
do that. I£ you start differentiating rather than 
standardizing does that create problems £or the 
aspirations o£ engineers? Just a couple o£ very quick 
remarks. They're starting to talk about whether or not 
developing basic research has implications beyond the 
Japanese company £or the rest of systems, university, 
government role and perhaps basic education. Japanese 
universities have been very good at undergraduate 
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education, they have not done much on graduate education. 
You probably know that Japanese universities produce 
almost as many engineers as Arnerican universities even 
though Japan has half the population. But they only 
produce ten percent as many Phd's and half of those donft 
get their Phd in a university. They get it by submitting 
work that they have done while they've been employed in an 
industria1 lab to the university from which they graduated 
and then they recieve a Phd so that when you visit a 
Japanese centra1 R and D lab, you will meet many doctors 
but their doctorates will have been recieved while they 
have been working in the company. What that means is that 
Japanese universities have very few graduate students who 
can be part of the research staff. If you compare that 
with the large reserarch oriented graduate education 
institutions in the USA you can see the difference. At MIT 
for instance we have more graduate students than 
undergraduates and those graduate students play a very 
important role in our research system as grotesquely 
underpaid research assistants but it helps the 
underpinnings. Japan lacks that and in part as a result 
its universities have not been centers £or generating new 
knowledge. Their mission has been primarily education, the 
transmission of existing knowledge. The government also, 
although we have the image of the Japanese government as 
being deeply involved in the tecnology system, the 
Japanese govrnrnent funds less of the Japanese research 
effort than is the case in any other major institution, a 
major country. The Japanese government funds, only about 
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twenty-five percent of Japan's total R and D budget. That 
compares to forty-five percent in the USA or about 
thirty-seven thirty-eight percent if you take out the 
defense budget and anywhere between thirty-five and 
forty-five percent in most European countries. As a result 
the government has tended to fund the kind of more applied 
research that industry is willing to cooperate in and 
government has funded relatively little, really 
f undamental basic research. The arguement is that the 
Japanese government is going to have to spend more money 
on funding basic research if the Japanese system is going 
to generate more basic research. However, as you may know, 
the Japanese government runs the largest per capita 
deficit of any of the highly industrialized countries. 
Significantly higher than the USA on a per capita basis. 
The Ministry of Finance is determined to get Japanese 
government expenditures down not up. So, that many efforts 
towards increasing the funding £or basic research have 
meant taking money away from other things which often have 
a stronger constituancy. Finally, the labor markets. It's 
going to be an interesting challenge to the Japanese to 
see if they can manage the changes in the technical labor 
markets that growing international labor competition and 
growing inter industry competition is going to create. As 
a result the Japanese are now worried that many of the 
features of their system that are very important parts o£ 
their great strength in applied technology and global 
scanning which I've talked less about, are going to be 
able to persist and continue in the future whether or not 
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they can simply add new levels to their technology system 
without changing their existing system. Let me stop there 
and ask you for your comments or questions or suggestions 
of things you ' d like to 
pursue ................................ I would like to know 
a little bit more about the organizational structure of 
the Japanese company because now I'm thinking about the 
NEC corporate lab. Does it mean that the Japanese 
organizational structures are becoming not a little bit 
more vertical, not so flat like now? What are the kinds of 
transformation or changes about the organizational 
structure typical in Japan? Are they rethinking about 
their own organizational 
structure?... ........................................ Itts 
less that they're becoming less flat but that theytre 
becoming wider horizontally. If you take your centra1 lab 
and make thirteen labs, youtre not really stretching out 
the vertical, you're creating the horizontal more. I 
should have added as you may know, one of the things that 
keeps the structure flat is the constant peeling out of 
people as they move up the ladders. I should say that not 
everyone moves here and stays here unti1 they retire at 
the age of sixty. As you probably know, at virtually every 
stage, perhaps not this one but certainly here. But both 
here and here(1 presume the speaker is showing some slides 
and making reference to them) you have people going out to 
affiliated companies so that you have something that the 
Japanese call sending out and it happens at every part of 
the corporation. It means taking some of your empoyees and 
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placing them on a temporary basis with suppliers, 
sub-contractors, customers, your technical people are 
often going out to work on joint research projects. 
Shupko?(the Japanese terminology £or the expression 
"sending out") can be either temporary or permanent, they 
use the isame word £or both.On the temporary one what 
you're often doing is trying to enhance the skills and the 
knowledge of your people by exposing them to other 
companies and to other ways of doing things so they go out 
and then they come back. But also especially not so much 
to customers but to your sub-contractors, your affiliated 
companies, it's a permanent out placement and that helps 
you keep your pyramid. You keep this pyramid structure by 
reducing the size of these cohorts, al1 the way along 
until you get to the top of your pyramid, a relatively 
small fraction of the people that started down here stay 
with the company until they're sixty. That's one of the 
incentives in the Japanese company. When we ask in a 
seniority wage system, how do you keep people motivated, 
how do you keep them working i£ it's a seniority wage 
system? Especially Americans find this very hard to 
understand because American companies regard themselves as 
using financial incentives to keep people performing well. 
In Japan it's the ability to stay with the company right 
up, it's only the very best performers that are kept and 
the other performers are shed out to sub-contractors or 
companies where the salaries are generally lower in the 
long term, the benefits are less and the management 
challenges are lower. This is how they keep their lean 
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organization. That's not likely to change and as you know, 
one o£ the interesting things about Japanese companies is 
that they still don't quite understand ........ 
Beginning o£ side B Pro£. E. Westney 25-3-91 .......... is 
a hundred plus companies depending on how you count it o£ 
al1 these affiliated sub-contractors and so on and there 
are a number that aren't even counted in the NEC group 
when you get right to the bottom. The parent company 
employs about thirty thousand people and it's one o£ the 
larger ones but it's small when you think o£ the scales o£ 
NEC's world-wide sales, i£ you consolidate the group that 
gets much larger. What that means is that NEC, the parent 
company, is primarily made up o£ sort o£ the corporate 
functions which include planning, finance, strategic 
planning . R and D and technology development, 
manufacturing and sales planning and marketing planning. 
That means that in many Japanese companies, in the parent 
companies, the proportion o£ people in the R and D and 
technology development can be anywhere from about eight to 
about twenty percent o£ the total employment. That means 
thast you have a very strong, you have a very strong 
representation o£ technology development in the mind set 
o£ management. It's one o£ the reasons why I think 
Japanese companies tend to be more technology driven, more 
technology intensive and technology literate than their, 
particularly American counterparts. That keeps the 
organization fairly flat and I don't see that 
changing ............ You have spoken about the evolution 
o£ these Japanese systems as an evolution interna1 to the 
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main manufacturer. I'm also interested in the changement 
in the(not very clear), I mean I know the sub-contracting 
in the Japanese system is a very integrated one. what is 
the role o£ small enterprises in this changement, has this 
changement also involved the small enterprises from a 
technology innovation point of view? ........ I think that 
what we are seeing, is that, just as the tec- 
hnology development capacity in the parent company, 
they're trying to raise it, so in the sub-contractors 
they're trying to increase the capacity to develop 
technology in partnership. So, what you have is the 
increasing exchange of researchers between your 
sub-contractors and your headquarter's company. I talked 
here about just the one way but it's actually a two-way 
flow. Your sub-contractors will frquently be involved in 
your technology development, perhaps not here as much, 
although sometimes in the corporate labs, but definitely 
in the divisional lab. What that means is that the system 
as awhole is trying to increase its' capacity to innovate, 
but it also means that the capacity to innovate here is 
very closely interdependent with the capacity here so 
these sub-contractors are unlikely to be able to take that 
added technology capacity and use it in the open market, 
you're still very tightly tied to the parent company and 
the companies try to keep it that way by this kind of 
exchange of researchers. ....................... MY 
question is about the way the Japanese try to compete on 
the international market. This is not quite clear to me so 
I would like to have some o£ your ideas. A few years ago 
it looked like the Japanese were going to invest more 
abroad, Sony is a typical example, and that they were at 
least, starting to become rea1 international companies, 
which does not appear a correct interpretation now because 
they remain Japanese companies with manufacturing 
capacities abroad. This is one point, so how is this 
changing? Another point is, the Japanese, in order to 
compete with our technology, they have to influence in 
some way the international standardizationm system because 
they competein areas like telecomunication, cars and so on 
where standards are becoming increasingly more important. 
So, how do they act on this international body to make 
pressure? I know that sometimes they try to get into joint 
research with European or USA companies and my persona1 
belief is that we should not except because they are 
faster than we are in transferring production, whatever we 
find together so they will beat us......I would also like 
to know in this picture, what is the rea1 role o£ MITI in 
designing a strategy for the big companies which look to 
be very compact and very well organized. . . . . . . . . .Let me 
start with the last one and work back the role - 
MITI which is a very interesting and controversia1 one in 
Japan. MITI is a ministry which has really been struggling 
with what its role is going to be as Japanese companies 
become more internationalized, it's harder and harder £or 
MITI to exercise influence on Japanese companies as they 
become less and less dependent on good relations with the 
Japanese government at home. MITI, I think is moving in 
two directions. One is that MITI has really marked as its 
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major mission, currently the opening of Japan's markets, 
to try and encourage imports,to try and encourage Western 
firms to come into Japan to be the Ministry which speaks 
£or internationalization within the Japanese government. 
That is intnsifying some of the bureaucratic infighting 
because ministries like the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Posts and 
Telecomunications in Japan see their job as defending 
Japan against the outside which is often turning into 
defending their turf against MITI. So MITI is walking a 
very uneast tightrope now within Japan between pushing 
internationalization and avoiding outright war with the 
other ministries. The other thing MITI is doing is turning 
its attention to small and medium-sized businesses within 
Japan more and trying to foster their development but in 
terms of influencing the internationalization strategies 
of Japanese companies, MITI has taken a surprisingly low 
profile on this. Where it has tried to intervene is to try 
and prevent Japanese companies from major, very public 
acquisitions that are likely to be controversial. 
Apparently MITI tried to advise MAZUSCTA? not to acquire 
MCA studios, they were afraid it was too soon after Sony's 
acquisition of another big studio(Universa1, MGM) but of 
course it doesn't work if MAZ. wants to acquire a major US 
studio, MAZ. will acquire it no matter how many times MITI 
officials meet with MAZ. president and try to influence 
him. One of the interesting things about the Japanese 
government is that it has very few forma1 powers in terms 
of the regulations. Its influence has been very informa1 
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and its largely by the consent of the governed if as we 
have seen, the companies do not want to do what MITI wants 
them to do, ther's virtually nothing MITI can do about it. 
So it hasn't been able to influence the companies 
offshore. In terms of those internationalization 
strategies, we're seeing some interesting contrast develop 
because most Japanese companies have preferred to grow 
their own, to grow by interna1 growth rather than by 
acquisition, that's in Japan as well as externally. So 
that usually £or Japanese companies means starting small 
and growing gradually. Particularly, if you're talking 
about setting up offshore production facilities. What 
Japanese companies have tended to do is start a green 
field plant fairly small, train that beginning staff very 
intensively. It's starting to change now but unti1 the 
Japanese began it we had never in internationalization 
strategies seen blue-collar workers being flown back to 
the parent company to learn on the ground how to run a 
production system and then being flown back to the 
factory. Managers yes, blue-collar workers no. Now that 
started to change and Ford did that for its blue-collar 
workers in its new Spanish plant, clearly learning from 
the Japanese. But, if you're basically interested in that 
intensive, a people intensive technology transfer, you 
start small and grow gradually. That's what the Japanese 
have tended to do in the USA withtheir transplants where 
they've tried to increase too quickly, they've often run 
into problems. Mazda's plant at Flat Rock, Michigan in 
autos is an example, they tried to increase too quickly 
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and ran into very serious labor problems. So, I think it's 
maybe too early to judge, I think it's just starting and 
it will be the next ten years that we'll see this gradual 
expansion. Now, some other companies have decided to take 
alternative routes, Hitachi £or example is clearly taking 
a slow gradual approach. Fujitsu is a contrast. Fujitsu is 
growing internationally by acquisition and it acquired a 
very large stake in Amdaw? an American computer market and 
now in ICL. I think many Japanese companies are watching 
Fujitsu with great interest because the ICL acquisition is 
probably going to cause Fujitsu some major problems. My 
own information, and it's very scattered, it's not very 
sistematic, is that ICL was not happy about Fujitsu's 
changing the linkage from a strategic alliance to an 
equity alliance. Its financial people may have been happy 
because it gave ICL an infusion of capital, its technology 
people were very unhappy and its sales people were unhappy 
and other Japanese companies are watching that to see 
whether that acquisition strategy really works. If it 
causes problems for Fujitsu I think we'll see most 
Japanese companies the much slowere do-it-yourself 
strategy but I think that will come. It's been slowed by 
something that's very idiosyncratic in Japan and that's 
the crash of the Japanese financial markets, especially 
the fa11 on the property market because many Japanese 
markets were borrowing for their international expansion 
on the basis of bank loans for which the security was 
their land and when the land crisis fell they were 
over-extended and the banks panicked and started to call 
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in some of their loans so they had to pull back a bit. 
But, I think that will last probably only two or three 
years and we' l1 see them especially in Europe, wef l1 see 
them starting to move again in internationalization of 
production. The really interesting challenge foe them is 
internationalizing technology development because 
ironically, this is another case where success may breed 
f ailure. Arnerican companies are increasingly 
internationalizing their R and D because they have to, 
because their haedquarters R and D organization has been 
terribly bad at listening to overseas customers.So, their 
European operations have pushed to have their own 
technology development because what was designed in the 
USA didn't fit the needs o£ the European customer. The 
Japanese have been much more successful at designing 
products in Japan that suit the needs o£ world-wide 
markets and can actually differentiate across markets. 
That very success means that their technology people donft 
believe they have to put R and D overseas, they don't want 
to put R and D overseas. They don't want to spend money on 
hiring expensive foreign engineers and scientists 
whoprobably wonft be able to deliver the kinds o£ products 
that the Japanese organization thinks it should have. 
Wefre seeing in Japanese companies something o£ a clash, 
battle between corporate managers who see that they have 
to put R and D offshore if only £or public image reasons 
and the Japanese technology organization which says it's 
going to be a colossal waste o£ money, we can do it here. 
So, that, I think is going to be one of their major 
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problems in the future. ............... (this next cornrnent 
is not very clear at all) ....- 
I think it's part of it, I think there's another thing 
that's involved here. That is what the Japanese most want 
to learn, out of those alliances,I think, is how to manage 
Western technology development people because they don't 
really know how to do it on their own. To them, these 
Western engineers and scientists are really strange people 
and they don't quite know how you manage them, how you set 
up facilities. It's like Toyota going into a joint venture 
with Genera1 Motors. It entered that joint venture 
basically to learn how to manage Arnericans and then to 
translate that into their own plant. I think you're right 
about the strategic alliances. The Japanese want, it's an 
obscelecing bargain in the sense that there are things 
that Japanese want to learn and then they won't need their 
partner anymore. I think what they want to learn is less 
the specific technology than how you set up the human 
resource management systems.So that when they set up their 
own labs they'll know how to hire, they'll know how to 
create incentives, they'll know how to create career 
structures, they'll know what these people want. I agree 
with you that it's probably not in the interests of 
Western companies to teach them those things ......... My 
question is..The Japanese mode1 o£ migration from the 
basic research to the production, in my opinion, people in 
Europe and in the USA are very different. The people 
involved in research are very often very individualists. 
They don't feel part o£ the company. Do you think that 
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this kind of mode1 could work also in the USA or in 
Europe?. . . . .. . . I think that there are parts of it that 
could work, I think what would work best in the USA, and 
some companies are actually doing it, is moving people 
down and then back, not a permanent move but sort of 
moving between because I think you're right that American 
and probably European technology development people define 
themselves as belonging here not here. But one of the 
reasons I think, that the technology development people 
are so reluctant to move is that this £or them is a 
totally unfamiliar environment, they've never been in it 
before, they don't know people there, it's sort of very 
threatening whereas what the Japanese do with their 
initial training program is to train these people side by 
side with the people who are managing here and provide 
them with some short but with some initial experience. So 
that this is no longer a foreign planet, this is something 
that you know and you have actually friends from your 
entry level training program. I think actually that 
attitude of the corporate R and D people that we belong up 
here not to thet rest of the company, is created by the 
companies and it's created by them in the kinds of 
training and incentives they use. I do believe that entry 
level training where you train these people in what 
business they're in, what the value added activities are, 
give them some exposure to that, so that they feel more a 
part o£ the company is worth every penny of that 
investment. My experience is that most but not al1 of the 
technology development people would like that kind of 
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experience and exposure.1 think that one of the reasons 
that we haven't trained our engineers better, at least in 
American corporations to do this and to understand the 
business, is the top management is often very ambivalent 
about having its technology development people get ideas 
about the business. They don't want the engineers thinking 
that they can run the business, they want them to realize 
that they have only a limited, partial view and they have 
to leave it to top management to m,ake the important 
decisions.When you create this system, you create a system 
in which these people are going to have some ideas about 
what the direction of the corporation should be. You've 
got to develop systems to use that rather than simply te11 
them no go away to the lab, your job is to develop the 
technology, my job is to run the company. I think it's in 
the training. I think that kind of training will work, and 
I think we're going to have to move to that in the future 
if we want our technology development people to understand 
where they fit in the system. Any comments on that, any 
reaction to that? It's mY own persona1 
view... .......... The only comment is that if you have many 
people in manufacturing come from research and 
development. Manufacturing in Japan is something different 
from what is in Europe and in the States, it's really 
something different because people in research and 
development have a different way of thinking. Here and in 
America ....p eople in manufacturing ......... I agree that 
it is. I think that we are going to find that really 
successful companies in the future are going to have to 
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bring that way of thinking closer together in Western 
companies and the challenge is how you do that. Clearly, 
you don't do it by just copying the Japanese system. It's 
got to be a new system to develop. I think even on that, 
how you train your people becomes very important. Do you 
train them so that you reinforce these very different ways 
of thinking or do you train them so they can bridge? 
That's the companyls responsability, that doesnlt happen 
in the university, it doesn't even happen in management 
schools, it happens in the company ................ I worked 
in automotive industry in Alfa Romeo and after in Fiat 
auto in the department £or technical training so I read 
with attention the last book that mentioned that change 
and I appreciate the introduction opposite mass 
production. I believe that al1 technics required by link? 
production are technics that we know in Europe and the 
USA, we know the whole philosophy, we know that the market 
is the first and not the last, we know the 
technic(technique) of just-in-time and so on. But we 
cannot do the application of al1 these techniques, this is 
aterrifying problem. I think it would take perhaps ten 
years to change from mass production philosophy to link 
production philosophy. What should we do?... ......... Itls 
a rea1 challenge and itls especially a challenge because 
i£ we think too much about matching what the Japanese are 
doing today we will have the same problem tomorrow because 
the Japanese are not standing still. The Japanese system 
is also starting to change and one o£ the interesting 
challenges £or US and European companies is not just to 
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match what the Japanese are doing today but to try and 
leapfrog them so you're anticipating where they're going. 
One of the interesting challenges is the extent to which 
if where you're going is really a market pull strcture 
with this customized standardization, how important are 
some of the currently in production technologies? Maybe 
some of them aren't as important as others and maybe it's 
more important to think about moving towards the market 
pull where the customer is ordering the vehicle that gets 
dlivered and work back from that rather than trying to 
match the Japanese on the lean production 
itself........One of the very interesting things that a 
comparative study in Sead manufacturing managers which you 
may have seen, it was done a couple of years ago, 
comparing Japanese, European and American manufacturing 
managers and asked them about their goals £or the next 
five years. to rate a list. For the Americans and the 
Europeans quality had now moved right up to first or 
second. For the Japanese that was now way down on the list 
and you ask why don't the Japanese care about the quality 
anymore? The answer is well yes they've done that, they've 
got that embedded in their systems, they're .not thinking 
about quality anymore as a problem, they're thinking about 
maintaining it. But what they're thinking now is new 
product development, new businesses, new technology. Those 
are very far down on the list of the Americans and the 
Europeans and my friends in Insead? were saying, we're in 
grave danger of being sort of hypnotized by the Japanese 
mode1 so that we're trying to match them now and not 
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thinking about where they're going, where they're heading. 
By the time we match what they're doing today, they're 
going to be somrplace else and what we have to do is go 
round and that's a rea1 challenge. That is going to 
require much more creativity ....... But this moment the 
productivity of Europe is half the productivity of Japan 
or less? . . . . . . . .. One of the problems in the automotive 
industry around the world is excess capacities so you're 
having to invest at a time when you yourself are lean not 
only in organization but in resources to invest in the 
future. That's a very important problem for many 
companies ........... in the lab in Japan but they didn't 
succeed in this kind of operation because it's very 
difficult to establish their own area in the lab in Japan 
according to al1 the kinds of difficulties you mentioned. 
So what do you think will be the furture directions of 
corporations between Western companies and Japanese 
companies in order to learn about each other's emerging 
system? Do you think that the way to be directly in Japan 
is the right way or do you think that the corporation 
between Western companies and Japanese companies could be 
different? ........... My own feeling, and this is a very 
strong persona1 pre judice and I have obvious biases here 
so discount them, my own feeling is that the Western 
company that is serious about competing with the Japanese 
globally has to be in Japan. You have to compete with the 
Japanese on their own ground really to understand their 
system and to get a sense where it is they're heading. 
What that might say.is that Western companies should start 
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forming alliances to penetrate Japan rather than each 
company having to do it separately, rather than alliances 
wwith the >Japanese. One o£ the ironies £or American 
corporations is that under American law it's much easier 
£or an American company to form an alliance with a 
Japanese company than with another American company in the 
same industry . An alliance with another American company 
in the same industry brings you under anti-trust 
regulation but an alliance with a Japanese company 
doesn't. But in terms of penetrating Japan, I think we're 
seeing a growing nurnber o£ American companies being 
surprisingly successful at establishing R and D centers in 
Japan. Digital equipment has an R and D center in japan 
that it has had since 1982, Kodak, IBM o£ course has a 
very large scale Rand D organization, . . . . . . . in France 
has an r and D center in Japan, ICI, the pharmaceutical 
companies are moving into Japan. They're finding it easier 
than they thought to penetrate the Japanese recruitment 
organization. Where it's often difficult is integrating 
that lab into their networks internationally, that's the 
rea1 challenge. I think that some companies are finding 
that much more difficult than they anticipated. They can 
hire good people but how well can they use them. I think 
we're seeing that second stage now..........Donrt you 
think that going to Japan just to set research and 
development labs is still a defensive action not an 
aggressive action? the rea1 point is to se11 our products 
to Japanese and to know what their market is like which is 
very difficult because we don't speak their language, they 
34 
donft help us in getting around in Japan. If you try going 
around in Tokyo, maybe you can but I cannot because they 
donft have numbers in the streets, itfs completely 
different unless you are Japanese or very close to them. 
So they are defending in many ways their market and unti1 
we are not able to attack their market any action we do is 
defensive action.. . . . . . . . . . I agree and I think that the 
companies that are most successful in setting up their R 
and D centers in Japan are companies that are really 
pushing on the Japanese market. Eastman Kodak is one £or 
example that decided it had to be in Japan because its 
world-wide competitor was Fuji and it was impossible £or 
them to really understand Fuji from Rochester, New York so 
they had made a major marketing push. Their aim is to get 
their market share in consumer photgraphics up to about 
20% and theyfre very close now. Digital Equipment is also 
up to about 25% of the mini-computer market now so the R 
and D center linked to a market push just to stand alone, 
youfre right, youfre not going to really learn what you 
need to learn. The other challenge is do you need 
manufacturing on the ground in Japan and a growing amount 
of companies are saying yes we need not only marketing but 
we need manufacturing. We need the whole value added chain 
really to penetrae because in order to penetrae the system 
we need our own people, our own Japanese and our own home 
country people that can speak Japanese and function in 
Japan in order to make that work. Itfs a major investment 
and not every company needs to make it. But a company that 
intends to be a global competitor head to head with the 
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Japanese has to make it... ........ Thank you very much £or 
putting up with my English al1 morning ....... Thank 
you....... End o£ " Japanese technology system 
25-3-9lncassette. 
